Evolutionary Stable Strategies to Defend and Attack with False Targets and Reliability Approach

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 PhD Student of Industrial Engineering, Payame noor University, Tehran, Iran

2 Associate Professor, Industrial Engineering Department, Faculty of Engineering, Shahed University, Tehran, Iran

3 Associate Professor, Industrial Engineering Department, Malekashtar University of Technology, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

Determining the optimal and sustainable strategies to protect critical and sensitive systems, is one of the main objectives of the organization. To achieve this goal, efficient and stable strategies must be determined. In this paper first, modeling the optimal strategies to defend and attack in the stationary state is presented, provided that the defender to deceive the attacker provides a number of false targets. In the static model, considering the probability of a successful attack, attacker capability in identifying false targets, reliability block diagram and game theory approach in finding the balance point, a nonlinear programming model is proposed to determine the amount of investment defend and attack. Then, according to the results of the static model, system dynamics and implications of evolutionary game theory, a new and dynamic approach to determine sustainability strategies of defense and attack is presented. According to the proposed model, evolutionary stable strategy for the defender, attacker and system is examined. Finally, presented model is illustrated for an applied case and final findings are analyzed.

Keywords


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