انتخاب سیاست هماهنگ سفارش‌دهی در زنجیره تامین دو سطحی با استفاده از رویکرد نظریه بازی ها

نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکتری گروه مهندسی صنایع، دانشگاه پیام نور، تهران، ایران

2 استادیار، گروه مهندسی صنایع، دانشگاه پیام نور، تهران، ایران

3 دانشیار گروه مهندسی صنایع دانشگاه تربیت مدرس

چکیده

یکی از موضوعاتی که کمتر در ادبیات زنجیره تأمین مورد توجه قرار می‌‌‌گیرد مدل‌های کمی برای همکاری خریدار و تأمین کننده در زنجیره است. هماهنگ‌سازی سفارش‌‌دهی و آماده‌‌سازی در یک زنجیره تأمین مستلزم اتخاذ تصمیمات بر مبنای مدل‌های ریاضی است. رشد روزافزون رقابت و توجه به هماهنگی و همکاری در مدیریت زنجیره تأمین موجب گردیده است که این زمینه بیش از پیش مورد توجه قرار گیرد. در این مقاله سعی می‌‌شود روابط خریدار و تأمین کننده را با رویکرد نظریه بازی‌ها تحت دو سناریو (بدون همکاری و با همکاری) مورد بررسی قرار گیرد. در بازی‌های بدون همکاری درحالتی که خریدار از قدرت بیشتری برخوردار باشد، به عنوان رهبر (استکلبرگ خریدار) و در حالت دوم تأمین کننده به عنوان رهبر در نظر گرفته می‌‌شود (استکلبرگ تأمین کننده). آنالیز عددی، مقایسه بین سناریوها و تحلیل حساسیت مدل، اثر تغییر پارامترها بر هزینه‌‌ها و درآمد را نشان می‌‌‌دهد.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Choosing coordinated ordering policy in the two-level supply chain: A game theory approach

نویسندگان [English]

  • mohsen Dori 1
  • Meisam Jafari 2
  • Kamal Chaharsoghi 3
1 PhD. student, Faculty of Industrial Engineering, Payame Noor University, Tehran, Iran
2 Assistant Professor, Faculty of Industrial Engineering, Payame Noor University, Tehran, Iran.
3 Industrial Engineering, Tarbiat Modares Universiry, Tehran, Iran
چکیده [English]

Supply chain management is a systematic analysis and logical decision-making system among the various functions of an organization, which results in cost effective in the flow of resources, raw materials, information, and liquidity. One of the few issues that are being considered is quantitative models for the buyer and supplier cooperation. In this paper, we try to formulate the buyer-supplier relationship with the game theory approach in two models non-cooperative and cooperative. In non-cooperative games, when the buyer has more power, he is considered to be the leader (Buyer Stackelberg) and in the second place the supplier is considered as the leader (supplier Stackelberg). The numerical analysis of the comparison between the existing models and the sensitivity analysis of the model shows the effect of the change of parameters on the cost and income. In non-cooperative games, when the buyer has more power, he is considered to be the leader (Buyer Stackelberg) and in the second place the supplier is considered as the leader (supplier Stackelberg). The numerical analysis of the comparison between the existing models and the sensitivity analysis of the model shows the effect of the change of parameters on the cost and income.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • supply chain
  • Ordering
  • setup
  • Stackelberg game
  • cooperative game

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